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Abstract
Homomorphic Encryption has been considered the ’Holy Grail of Cryp-
tography’ since the discovery of secure public key cryptography in
the 1970s. In 2009, a long-standing question about whether fully ho-
momorphic encryption is theoretically plausible was affirmatively an-
swered by Craig Gentry and his bootstrapping construction. Gentry’s
breakthrough has initiated a surge of new research in this area, one
of the most promising ideas being the Learning With Errors (LWE)
problem posed by Oded Regev’s. Although this problem has proved
to be versatile as a basis for homomorphic encryption schemes, the
large key sizes result in a quadratic overhead making this inefficient
for practical purposes. In order to address this efficiency issue, Oded
Regev, Chris Peikert and Vadim Lyubashevsky ported the LWE prob-
lem to a ring setting, thus calling it the Ring Learning with Errors
(Ring-LWE) problem.
The underlying ring structure of the Ring-LWE problem is Z[x]/Φm(x)
where Φm(x) is the mth cyclotomic polynomial. The hardness of this
problem is based on special properties of cyclotomic number fields. In
this thesis, we explore the properties of lattices and algebraic number
fields, in particular, cyclotomic number fields which make them a good
choice to be used in the Ring-LWE problem setting.
The biggest crutch in homomorphic encryption schemes till date is
performing homomorphic multiplication. As the noise term in the re-
sulting ciphertext grows multiplicatively, it is very hard to recover the
original ciphertext after a certain number of multiplications without
compromising on efficiency. We investigate the efficiency of an imple-
mented cryptosystem based on the Ring-LWE hardness and measure
the performance of homomorphic multiplication by varying different
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The Ring Learning With Errors problem is based on the Learning With
Errors problem which was introduced by Oded Regev [28]. An informal
overview is given here. Let Φm(x) be the mth cyclotomic polynomial, R =
Z[x]/〈Φm(x)〉 be the ring of integers modulo Φm(x) and q be a prime such
that q ≡ 1 (mod m) be a large prime. Fix an error distribution over R, say
χ. For i ∈ N, let ei ∈ χ, let ai, si ∈ Rq be uniformly random ring elements.
Define bi = ais + ei. The goal is to distinguish a polynomial number of in-
dependent ‘random noisy ring equations’ from truly uniform pairs. In other
words
{ai, bi}poly(n)i=1 ≈ {ai, ui}
poly(n)
i=1
where ui’s are uniformly sampled from Rq.
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows us to perform
computations on ciphertexts. In the past few years, many homomorphic en-
cryption schemes have been proposed, that have been based on the Ring
Learning With Errors problem. Unfortunately these encryption schemes are
yet to be used in industry mostly because of the amount of time it takes
to perform operations in such schemes. The biggest crutch is homomorphic
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multiplication. Since a message is encrypted with a small amount of noise,
every time a multiplication is performed, this noise grows multiplicatively.
Thus after a certain number of multiplications, the original encrypted plain-
text is lost because of the large error. Fortunately, there have been many
methods introduced such as key-switching to deal with this problem. This
work investigates the performance of homomorphic multiplication in the en-
cryption scheme implemented by Chris Peikert and Eric Crockett in their
Lattice Cryptography library called Λ ◦ λ [8].
The first four chapters develop the mathematical background required to
understand the Ring Learning With Errors problem and the efficient algo-
rithms implemented in [20]. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the Ring Learning
With Errors problem as well as the experiments performed on the homo-
morphic encryption scheme, we conclude with a summary of our results and
plans for future work.
2
Chapter 2
Lattice Theory and Hard
Problems
2.1 Lattices
Lattices are regular arrangements of points in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
Definition 2.1.1. Let B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bk} be a set of linearly independent
vectors in Rn. The lattice L generated by B is
L(B) = {a1b1 + a2b2 + . . .+ akbk| a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Z}
The set B is called the basis of the lattice L(B). The integers n and k are
called the dimension and rank of the lattice. When n = k, L(B) is called a
full-rank lattice [24].
Definition 2.1.2. The span of the lattice L generated by a basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bk}
3
is defined as






We will focus on full-rank lattices for the rest of this discussion, but one
could easily extend these concepts to more general dimensions as well. Ob-
serve that the definition of a lattice looks very similar to that of a vector
space, except that a vector space would be defined by a linear combination
of vectors with real coefficients. An important consequence of this definition
is that lattices are discrete sets, that is, for every x ∈ L, there exists a neigh-
borhood N(x, ε) = {y ∈ Rn : ||x− y|| ≤ ε} such that N(x, ε) ∩ L = {x}. In
particular, lattices are discrete additive subgroups of Rn [15].
A simple example of a lattice is the integers, Z ⊂ R which forms a 1-
dimensional lattice, similarly Zn ⊂ Rn forms an n-dimensional lattice. The
set of even integers 2Z is a subgroup of R and thus forms a lattice. Figure
2.1 below illustrates the integer lattice of even numbers in two dimensions..
Although the set of odd integers is discrete, it does not form a lattice, since
it is not a subgroup of the real numbers.
The basis of a lattice is not unique and in fact any two bases of a lattice
are related by a matrix having integer coefficients and determinant is plus or
minus one (See Figure 2.2).
Definition 2.1.3. The fundamental domain of a lattice corresponding to the
basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bk} is the parallelopiped given by:
F (B) = {t1b1 + t2b2 + . . .+ tnbn : 0 ≤ ti < 1}
The fundamental domain defined by vectors b1 and b2 is shown by the shaded
region in Figure 2.2. We need this quantity to define the determinant of the
lattice, which is the volume of F (B). In other words detL = vol(F (B)).
4
b1 = (0, 2)
b2 = (2, 0)
b1 + b2
Figure 2.1: Lattice of even integers
Recall our previous remark about bases of the same lattice given by B and
B′ being related by a unimodular linear transformation U such thatB′ = BU .
Observe that
vol(F (B′)) = | detB′|
= | detBU |
= | detB|| detU |
= | detB|
= vol(F (B))
Thus every basis of a lattice L has the same volume, which means that the
determinant of the lattice is an invariant, independent of the fundamental
domain used to calculate it [15].
One of the fundamental problems associated with lattice theory is finding
the shortest vector in the lattice. An important quantity that we shall need






Figure 2.2: Different bases for the same lattice
Definition 2.1.4. The smallest distance between any two distinct lattice
points is given by λ1(L) = inf{||x− y|| : x,y ∈ L,x 6= y}.
The following result is Minkowski’s theorem is one of the most important
theorems in lattice theory [24].
Theorem 2.1.5. For any lattice L of rank n and any convex set S ⊂ span(L)
symmetric about the origin, if vol(S) > 2n det(L), then S contains a non-zero
lattice point v ∈ S ∩ L \ {0}.
Minkowski’s theorem (Theorem 2.1.5) relates the minimum distance of a
lattice to its determinant. Take S = N(0,
√
n det(L)1/n) ∩ span(L), which
is the open ball centered at the origin with radius
√
n det(L)1/n. Since S
contains an n-dimensional hypercube of length 2 det(L)1/n, we have that
vol(S) > 2n det(L). Thus by Minkowski’s theorem, S contains a non-zero
lattice point, in other words there exists a non-zero v ∈ L such that ||v|| <
√
n det(L)1/n. We can now state the following result:
Corollary 2.1.6. For any lattice L of rank n, we have λ1(L) <
√
n det(L)1/n.
Corollary 2.1.6 gives us a weak upper bound on the shortest distance of a
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vector in a lattice L [24]. Without loss of any generality, we will consider full
rank integer lattices for the rest of this discussion.
2.2 Worst Case Lattice Problems
Worst case lattice problems are commonly used as a security assumption for
cryptographic schemes since attacking lattice based systems would also entail
solving the underlying lattice problem which has been proven to be NP-hard
[23].
Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)
The shortest vector problem asks to find the shortest non-zero vector in a
lattice L given by basis B. This problem has a rich history which can be
traced back to Gauss and Hermite who studied an equivalent of the SVP
problem in the context of quadratic forms. Gauss even gave an algorithm
which solves this problem in two dimensions. Later Minkowski gave a tight
upper bound for the length of the shortest vector, we have seen this bound
in the previous section (Corollary 2.1.6).
Definition 2.2.1. Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)
Given a lattice basis B, find a non-zero vector v ∈ L(B) such that ||v|| =
λ1(L(B)).
Figure 2.3 illustrates this problem in two dimensions. Here the basis B =
{b1,b2} and the shortest vector is v. This problem is easy to solve in two
dimensions using Gauss algorithm but it becomes increasingly more difficult
in higher dimensions [24]. In cryptography, we are more interested in the ap-
proximation problem which can be defined with an approximation parameter





Figure 2.3: Shortest Vector Problem
Definition 2.2.2. Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SV Pγ)
Given a lattice basis B, find a non-zero vector v ∈ L(B) such that ||v|| ≤
γλ1(L(B)).
We want to base our security assumption of a cryptographic scheme on a
problem that has been proven to be hard in the worst case. Till date, no
such proof exists for this version of the problem. But there are proofs for the
decision version of this problem [28].
Definition 2.2.3. Decisional Approximate Shortest Vector Problem
(GAPSV Pγ)
Given a lattice basis B and a positive integer d, distinguish between the cases
λ1(L(B)) ≤ d and λ1(L(B)) > γ · d.
The SVP problem was conjectured to be NP-hard by van Emde Boas in 1981
and later proved to be hard under randomized reductions by Ajtai in 1997
[1]. In 2001, Micciancio [23] gave the strongest NP-hardness result known till





Closest Vector Problem (CVP)
A related lattice problem whose decision version is known to be NP-complete
is the Closest Vector Problem [24]. It is formally stated as follows:
Definition 2.2.4. Closest Vector Problem (CVP)
Given a lattice basis B and a target vector t, find x ∈ L(B) such that for all





Figure 2.4: Closest Vector Problem
Figure 2.4 illustrates this problem in two dimensions where the basis B =
{b1,b2}, the target vector t is marked in red and the closest vector x is
marked in magenta.
The associated decisional approximation problem with the approximation
parameter γ is stated below [28]:
Definition 2.2.5. Decisional Approximate Closest Vector Problem
(GAPCV Pγ)
Given a lattice basis B, a target vector t and a parameter d > 0, a YES
instance is when ||x−t|| ≤ d, whereas a NO instance is when ||x−t|| > γ · d.
The NP-hardness of CVP was established by reducing it to the subset sum
problem [24], thus solving CVP would imply that P = NP . It can be shown
that SVP is no harder than CVP [14]. Note that the trivial reduction of
9
considering the target vector t = 0 does not work since the CVP oracle
would return the 0 vector as the closest vector to itself.
2.3 LLL Algorithm
The LLL-algorithm was developed by Hendrik Lenstra, Arjen Lenstra and
László Lovász in 1982. This was the first attack against the SVP discussed
in the previous section. Subsequent attacks are based on this one. The goal
of the LLL-Algorithm is to obtain a nearly orthogonal lattice basis. It ap-
proximates the SVP in polynomial time within a factor of (2/
√
3)n. An upper
bound for this problem is given by Hermite’s Theorem which can be related
to Corollary 2.1.6 and is stated as follows:
Theorem 2.3.1. (Hermite’s Theorem). Every lattice L of dimension n con-






Intuitively it makes sense that the more orthogonal the vectors in the basis
are the shorter the distances between the vectors will be. The Hadamard








where 0 < H(B) ≤ 1. The closer H(B) is to 1, the more orthogonal are the
vectors in the basis [15]. We can obtain an orthogonalized set of vectors from
a lattice basis B̃ using Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization. The set B̃ need not
be a basis for the lattice L(B) because in Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization,
the vectors are obtained by adding and subtracting non-integer multiples of
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the basis vectors, as such the group law may not be preserved. Recall Gram-
Schmidt Orthogonalization as follows [3]:
For basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn}, define the Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalized
basis as B̃ = {b̃1, b̃2, . . . , b̃n}:
b̃1 = b1
b̃2 = b2 − µ1,2b̃1
. . .




where µi,j = 〈bj, b̃i〉/〈b̃j, b̃j〉.
Definition 2.3.2. A basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} is said to be LLL-reduced if
• Size Condition: |µi,j| ≤ 12 , for all 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n.




||b̃i−1||2 for all 1 < i ≤ n.
• We consider δ = 3
4
, but the algorithm works in polynomial time for
1
4
< δ < 1.
The algorithm works as follows:
Input: basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} for lattice L.
Output: LLL-reduced basis B.
1. Set k = 2 and b̃1 = b1.
2. While k ≤ n, loop:
(a) For j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1:
Set bk = bk − bµk,jeb̃j. [Size Reduction]






|| ˜bk−1||2: [Lovász Condition]
Set k = k + 1
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Else:
Swap bk−1 and bk
Set k = max(k − 1, 2)
3. End k loop
4. Return LLL-reduced basis B
The underlying idea behind the algorithm is to loop through the vectors
in the lattice basis B and check for the two conditions that will make the
basis LLL-reduced. Note that it is easy to form a basis that satisfies the Size
Condition, since we can do this for every bk by subtracting the appropriate
linear combinations of b1,b2, . . . ,bk−1. But in the LLL-algorithm, this size
reduction is done in stages, as the size reduction condition depends on the
ordering of the vectors. The most important step is checking the Lovász
Condition, which ensures that the length of the vectors do not decrease too
quickly.
Theorem 2.3.3. Given a basis B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} for lattice L, and sup-
pose
M = max{‖bi‖2 : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} ≥ 2
then the LLL algorithm finds a reduced basis L = L(B) using at most O(n5 log(M))
arithmetic operations.
The proof can be found in [16]. We will illustrate this algorithm using the










Note detL = | det[b1 b2 b3]| = 6.
1. Set k = 2.
2. Loop until k ≤ 3
3. Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 2− 1 = 1:
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(a)












(b) Check ||b̃2||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
2,1)||b̃1||2 → TRUE → set k = 3.
4. For k = 3.
Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 3− 1 = 2:
(a) j=1





























5. Check ||b̃3||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
3,2)||b̃2||2 → FALSE → Swap b̃2 and b̃3, k =
3− 1 = 2.








7. Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 2− 1 = 1:
(a)












(b) Check ||b̃2||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
2,1)||b̃1||2 → TRUE → set k = 2 + 1 = 3.
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8. k = 3
Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 3− 1 = 2:
(a) j=1

























9. Check ||b̃3||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
3,2)||b̃2||2 → FALSE → Swap b̃2 and b̃3, k =
3− 1 = 2.








11. Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 2− 1 = 1:
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(a)












(b) Check ||b̃2||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
2,1)||b̃1||2 → TRUE → set k = 2 + 1 = 3.
12. For k = 3.
Loop j = 1 to j − 1 = 3− 1 = 2:
(a) j=1


























13. Check ||b̃3||2 ≥ (34 − µ
2
3,2)||b̃2||2 →TRUE → set k = 3 + 1 = 4. Stop
loop.











For a sanity check - detL = | det[b1 b2 b3]| = 6, we see that the determinant
of the new basis is equal to that of the old basis. Now let us check whether
the algorithm truly returns a more orthogonal basis than our original basis.


















For the purposes of this thesis, we will assume that the reader is familiar with
basic group, ring and field structures. Further reading about these topics can
be found in [10].
One of the main goals of algebraic number theory is to extend the rational
numbers to include complex solutions to certain polynomials in Q[x] which
have no rational roots. More formally,
Definition 3.1.1. A number α ∈ C is algebraic if it satisfies a polynomial
equation
xn + an−1x
n−1 + . . .+ a1x+ a0 = 0
where ai ∈ Q for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . n− 1}.
From this definition we can intuitively think of the following concept,
Definition 3.1.2. A number α ∈ C is an algebraic integer if it satisfies a
polynomial equation
xn + an−1x
n−1 + . . .+ a1x+ a0 = 0
18




Figure 3.1: Hasse diagram depicting an algebraic extension of Q
Let us consider an example of extending Q. Consider f(x) = x2 − 2, clearly
f(x) ∈ Q[x]. The equation f(x) = 0 has no roots in the rational numbers.
So we want to extend Q to a field and look for a ’new’ number α in this field
such that it is a root of f(x). Symbolically, we call α =
√
2 and say that α is
algebraic over Q. We can define K as the smallest subfield of C containing
both α and Q. Then K = Q(α) is a simple algebraic extension of Q depicted
in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.1.3. If K is a subfield of C such that K = Q(ω) for some root
of unity ω, then K is called a cyclotomic field.







−3) = {a+ b
√
−3|a, b ∈ Q} is a cyclotomic field, since Q(
√
−3) =
Q(ω). We will be investigating cyclotomic fields in more detail in later chap-
ters.
Let K be a subfield of C and α ∈ C be algebraic over K. Some important
definitions and properties of K(α) are described below [2] .
Definition 3.1.4. The unique monic polynomial p(x) ∈ K[x] such that
IK(α) = 〈p(x)〉
where IK(α) = {f(x) ∈ K[x]|f(α) = 0}, is called the minimal polynomial of
α over K and is denoted by irrK(α).
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Definition 3.1.5. The degree of α over K is defined by
degK(α) = deg(irrK(α))
Definition 3.1.6. The degree of the extension K(α) over K is defined by
[K(α) : K] = n
where n = deg(irrK(α)).
Theorem 3.1.7. The minimal polynomial irrK(α) is irreducible in K[x].
Definition 3.1.8. The conjugates of α over K are the roots in C of irrK(α).
Theorem 3.1.9. The conjugates of α over K are distinct.
It is easier to understand these properties with an example. Consider α =
1 + i√
2
∈ C. Then α is a root of x4 + 1 ∈ Q[x]. Since x4 + 1 is irreducible in














x4 + 1 =
(





























We want to study algebraic number fields, in particular the properties of
cyclotomic fields to understand why they are used as the underlying ring
structure of homomorphic encryption schemes. In order to define algebraic
20
number fields in a simple manner, we need the following theorem about
multiple extensions.
Theorem 3.1.10. Let K be a subfield of C and α1, α2, . . . , αn ∈ C be alge-
braic over K. Then there exists α ∈ C that is algebraic over K such that





















3), we want to express this as a simple
extension. The conjugates of
√










































3. We want to show that α is an algebraic number. So we
21






α2 = 5 + 2
√
6
α2 − 5 = 2
√
6
(α2 − 5)2 = (2
√
6)2
α4 − 10α2 + 25 = 24
α4 − 10α2 + 1 = 0
Thus α is a root of the monic quartic polynomial f(x) = x4−10x2 +1 ∈ Z[x],
which means that α is an algebraic number. In order for f(x) to be a minimal
polynomial over Q, we need to prove that it is irreducible in Z[x] and therefore
in Q[x].
Suppose that f(x) is reducible in Z[x], this means that f(x) is the product
of two polynomials
• Case 1: f(x) = (x3 + ax2 + bx+ c)(x+ d) or
x4 − 10x2 + 1 = (x3 + ax2 + bx+ c)(x+ d)
where a, b, c, d ∈ Z. Notice that the only constant term on the right
must be equal to the constant term on the left, in other words cd = 1.
But since both c, d ∈ Z, we have c = 1, d = 1 or c = −1, d = −1. This
means that the only possible linear factors for f(x) are x− 1 or x+ 1.
Now f(−1) = f(1) = −8 6= 0, therefore f(x) does not have any linear
factors.
• Case 2: f(x) = (x2 + ax+ b)(x2 + cx+ d). Then we have
x4 − 10x2 + 1 = (x2 + ax+ b)(x2 + cx+ d)
= x4 + (a+ c)x3 + (b+ ac+ d)x2 + (bc+ ad)x+ bd
22
where a, b, c, d ∈ Z. Equating coefficients of like terms, we get
a+ c = 0
b+ ac+ d = −10
bc+ ad = 0
bd = 1
Solving these equations, we get b = d = ±1, so that b+ d = ±2, which
















3) : Q] = 4
Now we definine an algebraic number field as follows:
Definition 3.1.11. An algebraic number field is a subfield of C in the form
Q(α1, . . . , αn) where α1, . . . , αn are algebraic numbers.
The following theorem simplifies our representation of an algebraic number
field and is intuitive by combining the fact that any algebraic number is of
the form a/b where b is a non-zero ordinary integer and a is an algebraic
integer, with Theorem 3.1.10.
Theorem 3.1.12. If K is an algebraic number field then there exists an
algebraic integer θ such that K = Q(θ).
One of the main factors in studying these algebraic number fields is to explore
whether the properties of integers in the rational numbers could be mimicked
in these extensions. The most important property being unique factorization,
recall that Z is a unique factorization domain (UFD). Keeping this in mind
we define an analogy of the integers in general number fields as [22].
Definition 3.1.13. The set of all algebraic integers that lie in the algebraic
23
number field K is denoted by OK and is called the ring of integers of K.
It is not surprising that the following statement is true
Theorem 3.1.14. Let K be an algebraic number field, then OK is an integral
domain.
Determining the ring of integers OK for an algebraic number field K is gen-
erally a difficult problem. But it has been classified for the case of K being
a quadratic field [2].
Theorem 3.1.15. Let K be a quadratic field and m be a unique squarefree
integer such that K = Q(
√














, m ≡ 1 (mod 4)
Illustrating this theorem with an example, let us find OK for K = Q(
√
−5)
and K = Q(
√













Recall that given an algebraic number field K of degree n and α ∈ K such
that K = Q(α), we defined the conjugates of α to be the roots of irrK(α).
What about the rest of the elements of K, do they also have conjugates
relative to K? For β ∈ K, let us express β as
β = c0 + c1α + . . .+ cn−1α
n−1
where c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ Q. Intuitively we could define the conjugates of β relative
to K as
βk = c0 + c1αk + . . .+ cn−1αk
n−1
where k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Definition 3.1.16. The set of algebraic numbers {β1 = β, β2, . . . , βn} is
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called a complete set of conjugates of β relative to K. Briefly, they are called
the “K-conjugates of β” or the “conjugates of β relative to K”.
Note [2] that the conjugates of β relative to K do not depend on the choice
of α such that K = Q(α). An important quantity related to the conjugates
of β relative to K is the field polynomial of β over K.
Definition 3.1.17. Let β ∈ K where K is an algebraic number field of
degree n. Suppose β1 = β, β2, . . . , βn are the K-conjugates of β. Then the





Consider K = Q(α), where α =
√
2, we know α1 =
√
2 and α2 = −
√
2. Let





x− 1 + α1
2
)(


























(4x2 − 4x− 1)
Notice that fldK(β) ∈ Q[x]. This observation [2] can actually be made for
all algebraic numbers in K:
Theorem 3.1.18. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n and β ∈ K,
then fldK(β) ∈ Q[x].
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3.2 Integral Basis of an Algebraic Number
Field
In order to define the notion of a basis over an algebraic number field we
need to define an important quantity called the discriminant.
Definition 3.2.1. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n and ω1, . . . , ωn ∈
K. Suppose σk : K → C where k = 1, 2, . . . , n denote the n distinct monomor-
phisms. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
ω
(1)
i = σ1(ωi) = ωi, ω
(2)
i = σ2(ωi), . . . , ω
(n)
i = σn(ωi)
denote the conjugates of ωi relative to K. Then the discriminant of {ω1, . . . , ωn}
is



























Definition 3.2.2. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n and β ∈ K.





where β(1) = β, β(2), . . . , β(n) are the conjugates of β with respect to K.
As an example, take K = Q(
√
2) and choose β =
√
2 then the conjugates of
β are β1 =
√
2 and β2 = −
√
2. We have






Now we can define a necessary and sufficient condition for an algebraic num-
ber field to be an extension of Q:
Theorem 3.2.3. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n and β ∈ K.
Then K = Q(β) if and only if D(β) 6= 0.
It turns out that every ideal in the ring of integers OK is finitely generated,
in other words OK is a Noetherian domain [2]. This fact helps us define the
concept of a basis for an ideal
Definition 3.2.4. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n. Let I be
a nonzero ideal of OK. If {η1, η2, . . . , ηn} is a set of elements of I such that
every element α ∈ I can be expressed uniquely in the form
α = x1η1 + . . .+ xnηn
where x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ Z, then {η1, η2, . . . , ηn} is called a basis for the ideal
I.
Consider K = Q(
√
7), we already know that OK = Z+Z
√
7 (from Theorem
3.1.15). Let I be the principal ideal of OK generated by 2 +
√
7, then




7)|a, b ∈ Z}
= {(2a+ 7b) + (a+ 2b)
√
7|a, b ∈ Z}
= {(2(c− 2b) + 7b) + c
√
7|c, b ∈ Z}
= {3b+ c(2 +
√
7)|c, b ∈ Z}
= 3Z + (2 +
√
7)Z
Thus {3, 2 +
√
7} is a basis for I, note that {2 +
√
7, 7 + 2
√
7} is another
basis for I and that D({3, 2 +
√
7}) = D({2 +
√
7, 7 + 2
√
7}) = 252. This
observation brings us to the definition of the discriminant of an ideal [2]
Definition 3.2.5. Let K be a algebraic number field of degree n, I be a non-
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zero ideal of OK, and {η1, . . . , ηn} be a basis for I. Then discriminant of the
ideal I is given by
D(I) = D({η1, . . . , ηn})
Intuitively, a basis of the principal ideal of OK generated by 1, that is OK
itself can be called an integral basis for K.
Definition 3.2.6. A basis for OK is called an integral basis for K.
In light of this new notion, and Theorem 3.1.15, we can state the following:
Theorem 3.2.7. Let K be a quadratic field and m be a unique squarefree
integer such that K = Q(
√
m). Then the integral basis for K is {1,
√
m}









when m ≡ 1 (mod 4).
Similar to defining the discriminant of an ideal, we can define the discriminant
of an algebraic number field as follows
Definition 3.2.8. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n and {η1, . . . , ηn}
be an integral basis for K. Then D(η1, . . . , ηn) is called the discriminant of
K and is denoted by d(K).
Ideally, it would be nice to have an integral basis for an algebraic number
field K of degree n which looks something like {1, η, η2, . . . , ηn−1} where every
element α ∈ K is a linear combination of 1, η, . . . , ηn−1, the field in which
this type of integral basis exists is called a monogenic number field [2].
Definition 3.2.9. For an algebraic number field K of degree n, if there exists
an element η ∈ OK such that {1, η, η2, . . . , ηn−1} is an integral basis for K,
then K is said to be monogenic and {1, η, η2, . . . , ηn−1} is called a power basis
for K.
It is clear to see that any quadratic number field is monogenic (from Theorem
3.2.7). But not every algebraic number field is monogenic. Dedekind showed
this by proving that the cubic field K = Q(θ) where θ is a root of x3 − x2 −
2x− 8 ∈ Z[x] does not have a power basis [9].
Let us describe the integral basis of a cyclotomic field. Recall that for a
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positive integer n and a primitive nth root of unity ζn, the nth cyclotomic






since Φn(x) ∈ Z[x] and is irreducible [10], we have that
irrQ(ζn) = Φn(x)
Observe that [Q(ζn) : Q] = φ(n). The following theorem is important to
remember for future sections [2]:
Theorem 3.2.10. The cyclotomic field Kn = Q(ζn) is monogenic for every
positive integer n.























= 1 + x+ x2 ∈ Z[x]
Observe that ω = −1
2




−3. It is clear that K3 = Q(
√
−3)and from
Theorem 3.2.7, the integral basis of K3 = {1,
√
−3}.
Two other important quantities associated with an algebraic number field K
are defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.11. Let K be an algebraic number field of degree n. Let α ∈
K. Let α1 = α, α2, . . . , αn be the K- conjugates of α. Then the trace of α is
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defined as
tr(α) = α1 + α2 + . . .+ αn
and the norm of α is defined by
N(α) = α1α2 . . . αn
One very simple example that we have seen since our middle school days is
when K = Q(
√
m) is a quadratic field. Take α ∈ K such that α = a + b
√
m,
the K-conjugates of α are α = a+ b
√
m and α′ = a− b
√
m. The trace of α is
tr(α) = α + α′ = 2a
and the norm of α is
N(α) = αα′ = a2 − b2m
3.3 Dedekind Domain and Unique Factoriza-
tion
The motivation behind learning about Dedekind domains lies in the quest
for finding unique factorization in algebraic structures. Under certain con-
straints, Dedekind domains can achieve unique factorization, as we shall see
in this section.
Definition 3.3.1. An integral domain D that is a Noetherian domain, inte-
grally closed and in which every prime ideal of D is a maximal ideal is called
a Dedekind domain.
From the definition we can see that the following statement holds [2]:
Theorem 3.3.2. The ring of integers OK in an algebraic number field K is
a Dedekind domain.
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Interestingly enough, the development of Dedekind domains came from the
following result.
Proposition 3.3.3. For an algebraic number field K, every non-zero ideal
I in OK can be written uniquely as the product of powers of distinct prime
ideals
I = Pe11 P
e2
2 . . .P
en
n
where P1, . . . ,Pn are distinct prime ideals and ei ≥ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
This property of the ring of integers led Dedekind to define Dedekind domains
as any integral domain D in which every non-zero proper ideal I can be
written as a finite product of prime ideals [10]. Unique factorization of ideals
in Dedekind domains means that we can define a notion of divisibility [2].
Definition 3.3.4. If A and B are non-zero integral ideals of a Dedekind
domain D, we say that A|B if there exists an integral ideal C of D such that
B = AC.
Consider K = Q(
√
−5), the ring of integers OK = Z + Z
√
−5 is a Dedekind








−5) are irreducible in D. We illustrate how the use of prime
ideals can represent the ideal 〈6〉 with a unique factorization. Take
P1 = 〈2, 1 +
√
−5〉
P2 = 〈3, 1 +
√
−5〉
P3 = 〈3, 1−
√
−5〉
as three distinct prime ideals. Observe that P21 = 〈2〉, P2P3 = 〈3〉, P1P2 =
〈1 +
√
−5〉, P1P3 = 〈1−
√
−5〉. Then






We can extend this concept of divisibility to fractional ideals, but first let us
formally define them [2]
Definition 3.3.5. Let D be an integral domain and K be the quotient field
of D, then a non-empty subset A of K with the following properties
1. α ∈ A, β ∈ A→ α + β ∈ A.
2. α ∈ A, r ∈ D → rα ∈ A.
3. there exists γ ∈ D with γ 6= 0 such that γA ⊆ D.
is called a fractional ideal of D.
Consider A = { n
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∈ A. For any r ∈ Z, rn
25
∈ A, since rn ∈ Z. Also 25A = Z. Thus A is a
fractional ideal of Z. Note that the quotient field of the ring of integers OK
is the algebraic number field K [10].
Observe that if A is a fractional ideal of D and γ ∈ D \ {0} is a common
denominator for A then γA is an integral ideal of D. We can define this
notion formally for a prime ideal P as follows
Definition 3.3.6. Let D be an integral domain and K be the quotient field
of D. For each prime ideal P of D, we define the set
P̃ = {α ∈ K : αP ⊂ D}
It is clear to see that P̃ is a fractional ideal of D.We get the following property
of a Dedekind domain from this observation:
Theorem 3.3.7. Let D be a Dedekind domain and P be a prime ideal of D.
Then PP̃ = D.
Let us illustrate this theorem with the following example. Suppose D =
Z + Z
√
6. D is the ring of integers of K = Q(
√
6) and the quotient field of
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D is K. Take the prime ideal P = 〈2,
√
6〉, then
P̃ = {α ∈ K|αP ⊆ D}
= {x+ y
√
6|x, y ∈ Q, (x+ y
√





6|x, y ∈ Q, 2(x+ y
√











6|2x ∈ Z, 2y ∈ Z, x ∈ Z, 6y ∈ Z}
= {x+ y
√

































Returning to the notion of defining divisibility for fractional ideals in a
Dedekind domain, suppose A is a fractional ideal in a Dedekind domain
D and α, β ∈ D \ {0} are common denominators, then
〈α〉A = B, 〈β〉A = C

















i , where P1, . . . ,Pn are
distinct prime ideals and ri, si, ui, ti are nonnegative integers (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
Since










ri + ui = si + ti
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Now we can define the prime ideal factorization of the




i , and this representation is unique [2]. This
representation of fractional ideals lets us define the concept of an “inverse of
an ideal”. For any prime ideal P of D, since PP̃ = 〈1〉, we have P̃ = P−1.
This means that we can define the inverse of any nonzero ideal I of a Dedekind
domain. It turns out that the nonzero ideals of a Dedekind domain D form
a multiplicative abelian group [2]. The following statement is a result of this
fact:
Theorem 3.3.8. Let K be an algebraic number field and OK be the ring
of integers of K. The set of all nonzero ideals of OK forms a multiplicative
abelian group I(K).
Now that we have an algebraic structure with unique factorization and divisi-
bility, we can try to replicate other properties of the integers in this structure.
One of the most important theorems that carry over is the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem [10]:
Theorem 3.3.9. Suppose D is a Dedekind domain, P1, . . . ,Pn are distinct
prime ideals in D and r1, r2, . . . , rn are positive integers then




1 ×D/Pa22 × . . .×D/Prnn
Equivalently for elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ D, then there exists α ∈ D then
α ≡ αi (mod Prii )
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
More generally, if I1, . . . ,In are pairwise relatively prime ideals of D and
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α1, . . . , αn ∈ D, then there exists α ∈ D such that
α ≡ αi (mod Ii)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3.4 Tensor Products
The tensor product representation of the mth cyclotomic number field K =
Q(ζm) is used extensively to make homomorphic operations more efficient in
the encryption schemes. In this section we will cover the basics of modules
and tensor products to gain a very general understanding of these structures.
For more details, the reader is referred to [10].
Definition 3.4.1. Let R be a commutative ring with unity. An R-module is
an abelian group M with an action R×M →M , written as rv where r ∈ R
and v ∈M which satisfies the following conditions:
1. 1v = v, ∀v ∈M
2. (rs)v = r(sv), ∀r, s ∈ R, ∀v ∈M
3. (r + s)v = rv + sv, ∀r, s ∈ R, ∀v ∈M
4. r(v + w) = rv + rw, ∀r ∈ R, ∀v, w ∈M
A submodule N ⊂ M is an abelian group which is closed under the scaling
operation. N almost behaves like an ideal of a ring - given r ∈ R, rv ∈ N
if v ∈ N . Keeping this in mind, one can define M/N to be the set of cosets
of N in M with the R-action defined as r(v + N) = (rv) + N , which shows
that M/N is also an R-module.
An example that we are familiar with from linear algebra is when R is a field,
then the R-module is just a vector space over R. Any additive abelian group
A is a Z-module where the R-action can be defined as the map (n, a)→ na
35
from Z× A→ A.
For R-modules M and N , their tensor product M ⊗R N is an R-module
spanned by all symbols m⊗ n where m ∈ M and n ∈ N and these symbols
satisfy the following laws:
1. (m+m′)⊗ n = m⊗ n+m′ ⊗ n, m⊗ (n+ n′) = m⊗ n+m⊗ n′.
2. r(m⊗ n) = (rm)⊗ n = m⊗ (rn).
The essence of these two conditions is captured in the definition of bilinearity
as follows:
Definition 3.4.2. Let M,N and P be R-modules, a map B : M × N → P
is R-bilinear if
• B(m1 +m2, n) = B(m1, n) +B(m2, n), and B(rm, n) = rB(m,n).
• B(m,n1 + n2) = B(m,n1) +B(m,n2), and B(m, rn) = rB(m,n).
For example, the dot product of two vectors v ·w is a bilinear map Rn×Rn →
R given by
• (v1 + v2) ·w = v1w + v2w, and (rv) ·w = r(v ·w).
• v · (w1 + w2) = vw1 + vw2, and r(v) ·w = r(v ·w).
The tensor product has what is called the universal mapping property. Infor-
mally this means that for R-modules M and N , their tensor product M⊗RN
is a universal object that turns bilinear maps on M × N into linear maps.
We can define the tensor product more formally as follows:
Definition 3.4.3. Let M and N be R-modules, their tensor product M⊗RN
is an R-module equipped with the bilinear map
M ×N ⊗−→M ⊗R N
such that for any bilinear map M × N B−→ P there is a unique linear map
M ⊗R N








Figure 3.3: Universal Mapping Property of M ⊗R N
Let us see some simple examples of tensor products. Consider Z/2Z⊗Z/3Z.
Since 3a = a for all a ∈ Z/2Z, we have
a⊗ b = 3a⊗ b = a⊗ 3b = a⊗ 0 = 0
Thus Z/2Z⊗ Z/3Z = 0. Note that a⊗ 0 = a⊗ (0 + 0) = a⊗ 0 + a⊗ 0, thus
a⊗ 0 = 0.
Now consider Z/2Z⊗ Z/2Z, this is generated by 0⊗ 0 = 1⊗ 0 = 0⊗ 1 and
1 ⊗ 1, note that 1 ⊗ 1 6= 0 since we can find a non-zero bilinear map from
Z/2Z×Z/2Z→ Z/2Z defined by (a, b)→ ab. Also 2(1⊗1) = 2⊗1 = 0⊗1 = 0,
which implies that 1⊗ 1 is of order 2. Thus Z/2Z⊗ Z/2Z ' Z/2Z.
The following theorem is one that is used later in representing a cyclotomic
number field as a tensor product of its sub-fields [30].
Theorem 3.4.4. For ideals I and J in R, there is a unique R-module iso-
morphism
R/I⊗R R/J ' R/(I + J)
where x̄⊗ ȳ → xy.
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3.5 Lattices and Minkowski Theory
This section combines the concepts we learned in Chapters 2 and 3 by ap-
plying lattice theory to number fields K/Q of degree n. We can think of the
number field as an n dimensional vector space and we will see that OK forms
a lattice in this vector space.
Suppose K is a number field and [K : Q] = n, then we have n embeddings
τi : K → C for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Consider the mapping




C, in other words KC is the direct product of the image
of K under each embedding. This mapping is often called the Minkowski
embedding and is defined as follows
a→ ja = (τ1a, τ2a . . . , τna)
where τ1, . . . , τn are the n embeddings. Note that the usual inner product





The goal of this section is to somehow relate K to a Euclidean space so
that we can define a lattice structure on it. In order to do this, observe that
the real embeddings of K already map into R, so our only concern is the
complex embeddings which can be thought of as embeddings into R2, by
splitting them into their real and imaginary components. Finally, note that
the complex embeddings are in pairs of complex conjugates. Thus we can
ignore half of the complex embeddings and still retain all the information
about our n embeddings. This leads us to the description of the Minkowski
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space [25],
KR = {(zτ ) ∈ KC|zρ ∈ R, zσ̄ = z̄σ}
where ρ1, . . . , ρr are the real embeddings and σ1, σ̄1, . . . , σs, σ̄s are the complex
embeddings such that n = r+ 2s. The Minkowski space allows us to think of
K as an n-dimensional Euclidean space, and the following proposition allows
us to interpret the ring of integers of K and its ideals as lattices [25].
Proposition 3.5.1. Let K be a finite extension of Q and a a non-zero ideal
of OK. Let j be the map from K into the Minkowski space KR. Then T = ja




Let us illustrate these concepts with an example. Take K = Q( 3
√
2), the
minimal polynomial is given by x3 − 2 so [K : Q] = 3 and we have three































































Recall that for quadratic number fields are monogenic, so a Z basis for OK
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2)2}. We can define a basis for our lattice as











































In the previous chapter, we studied how the Q can be extended to a field
which includes roots of polynomials that have no rational roots and the
properties of these algebraic extensions. In this chapter we will delve into
the main theory of understanding roots of polynomials in different number
fields, and cyclotomic number fields in particular. Our main purpose is to
understand how different properties of cyclotomic number fields and their
Galois groups help prove the hardness of Ring-LWE in a subsequent chapter.
4.1 Splitting Fields
We define the notion of a splitting field as the following
Definition 4.1.1. Let f ∈ F [x] have degree n > 0. Then an extension L of
F is a splitting field of f over F if
1. f = c(x− α1)(x− α2) . . . (x− αn) where c ∈ F and αi ∈ L
2. L=F (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
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Note that not all algebraic extensions of f over F can be splitting fields, for
example, consider Q ⊂ Q( 4
√
2), its minimal polynomial is x4 − 2, but Q( 4
√
2)
is not the splitting field of x4− 2 over Q. In fact, Q(i, 4
√
2) is a splitting field
of x4 − 2 over Q.
Splitting fields of a given polynomial f ∈ F [x] are not necessarily unique.
For example Q(
√
2) and Q[t]/〈t2 − 2〉 are both splitting fields of x2 − 2 over
Q. But they are isomorphic to each other [7].
Theorem 4.1.2. Given f1 ∈ F1[x] and an isomorphism Ψ : F1 ' F2, there






Figure 4.1: Diagram depicting Theorem 4.1.2
An important concept that follows from Theorem 4.1.2 is the following:
Proposition 4.1.3. Let L be a splitting field of a polynomial in F [x] and
suppose that h ∈ F [x] is irreducible and has roots α, β ∈ L. Then there is a
field isomorphism σ : L→ L that is the identity on F and takes α to β.
L L
∪ ∪
F (α) F (β)
σ
Figure 4.2: Diagram depicting Proposition 4.1.3
As an example, consider L = Q(
√
2) a splitting field of x2 − 2 over Q. We
can easily check that x2 − 2 is irreducible over Q and has roots ±
√
2 ∈ L.






Proposition 4.1.3 becomes very useful when constructing elements of Galois
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groups. We will see how in the next section. The rest of this section is devoted
to studying important properties of splitting fields.
Definition 4.1.4. An algebraic extension L of F is normal if every irre-
ducible polynomial in F [x] that has a root in L splits completely over L.
The following theorem relates normal extensions to splitting fields [7]:
Theorem 4.1.5. Suppose that F ⊂ L. Then L is the splitting field of some
f ∈ F [x] if and only if the extension L is normal and finite.
We consider a polynomial to be separable if it has distinct roots. More for-
mally:
Definition 4.1.6. A polynomial f ∈ F [x] is separable if it is nonconstant
and all its roots in a splitting field are simple.
We can extend the concept of separability to algebraic extensions:
Definition 4.1.7. Let F ⊂ L be an algebraic extension.
1. α ∈ L is separable over F if its minimal polynomial over F is separable.
2. F ⊂ L is a separable extension if every α ∈ L is separable over F .
It turns out that f ∈ F [x] is separable only when it is a product of irreducible
polynomials, each of which is separable and no two of which are multiples
of each other. The following proposition gives us an easy way of determining
when an irreducible polynomial is separable.
Proposition 4.1.8. Let f ∈ F [x] be an irreducible polynomial of degree n.
Then f is separable if either of the following conditions is satisfied.
1. F has characteristic 0, or
2. F has characteristic p > 0 where p is prime and p 6 |n.
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4.2 The Galois Group
It is fairly straightforward to define a vector space on a field extension, and
although this measures the size ( the degree of [L : F ] is given by the dimen-
sion of L considered as a vector space over F ), it does not tell us anything
deeper about the structure. Galois associated the roots of any polynomial
with the permutation of its roots. This group is now called the Galois group
in his honor and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.1. Let F ⊂ L be a finite extension. Then Gal(L/F ) is
{σ : L→ L|σ is an automorphism and σ(a) = a ∀a ∈ F}
Gal(L/F ) consists of all the automorphisms of L that “fix” the elements of
F . This forms a group under composition [31].
Proposition 4.2.2. If L is the splitting field of a separable polynomial in
F [x] then the Galois group of F ⊂ L has order |Gal(L/F )| = [L : F ].
For example, consider the complex numbers, where C = R(i). We know C is
the splitting field of the polynomial x2 + 1 in R[x]. Let σ ∈ Gal(C/R). Since
σ(r) = r for all r ∈ R, σ(i) = ±i. In other words,
σ1 : x+ iy → x+ iy
σ2 : x+ iy → x− iy
It can be easily shown that both σ1 and σ2 are indeed automorphisms of C,
and also σ22 = σ1. Thus Gal(C/R) = {1C, σ2} forms a cyclic group of order
2. It follows that Gal(C/R) ' Z/2Z. Note that |Gal(C/R)| = [C : R] = 2.
Now we can finally come to the main point that Galois associated polynomi-
als and their roots with many years ago. For a splitting field L of a separable
polynomial of degree n, f ∈ F [x], the Galois group Gal(L/F ) forms a sub-
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group of Sn [7]. When regarding Galois groups in terms of permutations, it
is natural to ask how these permutations relate to the corresponding field
extension. Let us define a term that will help us in this regard:
Definition 4.2.3. A subgroup H ⊂ Sn is transitive if for every pair of ele-
ments i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a τ ∈ H such that τ(i) = j.
Note that not all subgroups of Sn are transitive. Consider {e, (12), (34), (12)(34)} ⊂
S4. Since no element of the subgroup takes 1 to 3, this is not transitive.
How does transitivity relate to Galois groups and their corresponding field
extension? The following very important result was proved by Camille Jordan
[7]:
Proposition 4.2.4. Let L be the splitting field of a separable polynomial
f ∈ F [x] of degree n. Then the subgroup of Sn corresponding to Gal(L/F ) is
transitive if and only if f is irreducible over F .
This property is also important with regard to our Ring-LWE discussion later
on.
4.3 The Galois Correspondence
Associating the automorphisms on the roots of a polynomial with the permu-
tation group is only scratching the surface of Galois Theory. In this section,
we will cover the fundamental properties of the Galois correspondence be-
tween a field extension and its Galois group. But first we need to establish
some more terminology:
Definition 4.3.1. Suppose that we have a finite extension F ⊂ L with Galois
group Gal(L/F ). Given a subgroup H ⊂ Gal(L/F ), we define the fixed field
of H as
LH = {α ∈ L|σ(α) = α for all σ ∈ H}
Now we are ready for our first important theorem in this section [7].
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Theorem 4.3.2. Let F ⊂ L be a finite extension. Then the following are
equivalent
1. L is the splitting field of a separable polynomial in F [x].
2. F is the fixed field of Gal(L/F ) acting on L.
3. F ⊂ L is a normal separable extension.
This theorem lets us make the following definition
Definition 4.3.3. An extension F ⊂ L is called a Galois extension if it is a
finite extension satisfying any of the equivalent conditions of Theorem 4.3.2.
For example, the extension R ⊂ C is Galois, since C = R(i) is the splitting
field of x2 + 1 over R (by part 1 of Theorem 4.3.2). The following case is one
where being a Galois extension is straighforward.
Proposition 4.3.4. Suppose that F ⊂ L is a Galois extension and that we
have an intermediate field F ⊂ K ⊂ L. Then K ⊂ L is a Galois extension.
In order to understand the fundamental theorem of Galois Theory, we need
to understand the relation between normal subgroups and normal extensions.
Let us cover some terminology in this regard
Definition 4.3.5. Suppose that we have finite extensions F ⊂ K ⊂ L. Then
for an automorphism σ ∈ Gal(L/F ), we define a conjugate field of K as
σ(K) = {σ(α)|α ∈ K}
Now we can state the main theorem relating normal subgroups to normal
extensions [7].
Theorem 4.3.6. Suppose we have the fields F ⊂ K ⊂ L where F ⊂ L is a
Galois extension. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. K = σ(K) for all σ ∈ Gal(L/F ).
2. Gal(L/K) is a subgroup of Gal(L/F ).
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3. F ⊂ K is a Galois extension.
4. F ⊂ K is a normal extension.
In group theory, we learned that normal subgroups are important because
we can form quotient groups - recall that if G is a group and N is a normal
subgroup, then G/N forms a quotient group. The above theorem shows that
normal subgroups occur naturally in Galois theory and we can take full ad-
vantage of their properties. We can now state the fundamental theorem of
Galois Theory as follows:
Theorem 4.3.7. Let F ⊂ L be a Galois extension.
1. For an intermediate field F ⊂ K ⊂ L, its Galois group Gal(L/K) ⊂
Gal(L/F ) has fixed field
LGal(L/k) = K
Furthermore |Gal(L/K)| = [L : K] and [Gal(L/F ) : Gal(L/K)] = [K :
F ].
2. For a subgroup H ⊂ Gal(L/F ), its fixed field F ⊂ LH ⊂ L has Galois
group
Gal(L/LH) = H
Furthermore [L : LH ] = |H| and [LH : F ] = [Gal(L/F ) : H].
3. The maps between intermediate fields F ⊂ K ⊂ L and subgroups H ⊂
Gal(L/F ) given by
K → Gal(L/K)
H → LH
reverse inclusions and are inverses of each other. Furthermore if a sub-
field K corresponds to a subgroup H under these maps then K is Galois
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over F if and only if H is normal in Gal(L/F ). When this happens
there is a natural isomorphism
Gal(L/F )/H ' Gal(K/F )
Let us illustrate these concepts with an example. Consider Q ⊂ Q(ω, 3
√
2)












Figure 4.3: Structure of Q(ω, 3
√
2) and its sub-fields.


















Let us label the roots of x3 − 2 as α1 = 3
√
2, α2 = ω
3
√




easy to see that
σ → (123), τ → (23)
Since these permutations generate S3, we can conclude thatGal(Q(ω, 3
√
2)/Q) '
S3 and that σ and τ generate Gal(Q(ω, 3
√
2)/Q). Now σ has order 3, so
〈σ〉 = {e, σ, σ2}, similarly it is easy to check that 〈τ〉, 〈σ2τ〉 and 〈στ〉 are
subgroups of order 2. This gives rise to the structure shown in Figure 4.4.
From Theorem 4.3.7, and our discussion above, we can see the Galois cor-
respondence between the subgroups of Gal(Q(ω, 3
√
2)/Q) (shown in Figure
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Figure 4.4: Structure of Gal(Q(ω, 3
√
2)/Q) and its sub-groups.
4.4) and the subfields of Q(ω, 3
√
2) (shown in Figure 4.3). Note that Theorem
4.3.7 tells us that Figure 4.4 shows us all subgroups of Gal(Q(ω, 3
√
2)/Q) and
Figure 4.3 shows us all the subfields of Q(ω, 3
√
2) containing Q.
4.4 Galois Group of a Cyclotomic Extension
Recall that given:










Let us look at some examples of cyclotomic polynomials. For n = 2, we know
that Φ2(x) = x − (−1) = x + 1. When n = 4, the fourth roots of unity
whose powers are relatively prime to n are i and i3 = −i, thus Φ4(x) =
(x − i)(x − (−i)) = (x − i)(x + i) = x2 + 1. An elementary property of
cyclotomic polynomials is stated as follows [7]:
Proposition 4.4.1. The nth cyclotomic polynomial Φn(x) is a monic poly-
nomial with integer coefficients and has degree φ(n). Furthermore, these poly-
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nomials satisfy the identity




In this section, we are particularly interested in computing the Galois group
Gal(Q(ζn)/Q). In order to do this, we need to know the minimal polynomial
of ζn over Q. Intuitively we would think that Φn(x) would be the minimal
polynomial, but in order to conclude this, we need the following theorem [10]:
Theorem 4.4.2. The cyclotomic polynomial Φn(x) is irreducible over Q.
This implies that Q(ζn) is the splitting field of Φn(x) over Q and
[Q(ζn) : Q] = φ(n) which also means Q ⊂ Q(ζn) is a Galois extension (Theo-
rem 4.3.2). Equipped with these tools, we can now understand how the Galois
group of a cyclotomic extension is given by the following [7]:
Theorem 4.4.3. There is an isomorphism Gal(Q(ζn)/Q) ' (Z/nZ)∗ such
that σ ∈ Gal(Q(ζn)/Q) maps to [l] ∈ (Z/nZ)∗ if and only if σ(ζn) = ζ ln.
4.5 Cyclotomic Polynomials modulo a Prime
In a characteristic 0 field, the minimal polynomial of a primitive dth root of
unity in C is the cyclotomic polynomial Φd(x). But what happens when we
are working in a field of characteristic p, where p is a prime? Recall that in
Z[x], Φd(x) has the factorization




In studying the reduction of Φd(x) modulo p, we will restrict ourselves to the
case when (d, p) = 1 [7].
Proposition 4.5.1. Let F be a field of characteristic p and let α ∈ F be a
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root of unity, then there exists a d ≥ 1 relatively prime to p such that α is a
dth root of unity.
Recall that a dth root of unity α is primitive if d is the smallest positive
integer such that αd = 1. The roots of Φd(x) can be described as follows [7]:
Theorem 4.5.2. If (d, p) = 1 and q = pn then the following are equivalent:
1. q ≡ 1 (mod d).
2. Φd(x) splits completely in Fq.
3. Φd(x) has a root in Fq.
Furthermore when these conditions are satisfied, the roots of Φd(x) in Fq
consist of the primitive dth roots of unity.
In order to compute the irreducible factors of Φd(x), observe that since
(d, p) = 1, then [p] ∈ (Z/dZ)∗. Suppose m is the order of [p] in this group,
then [p]m = [1] or pm ≡ 1 (mod d). Thus m is the smallest positive integer
such that d|pm − 1. Formally stated [7]:
Theorem 4.5.3. Given d, let m be the order of [p] in (Z/dZ)∗. Then Φd(x)
is the product of φ(d)/m irreducible polynomials in Fp[x] of degree m.
Let us illustrate this concept with an example. Consider p = 2 and d = 5.
It is easy to check that the order of [2] in (Z/5Z)∗ is 4, thus m = 4. Using
Theorem 4.5.3, Φ5(x) is the product of φ(5)/4 = 1 irreducible polynomials of
degree 4 in F2[x]. Thus we can conclude that Φ5(x) = x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 is
irreducible in F2[x]. By Theorem 4.5.2, the roots of Φ5(x) are the primitive
5th roots of unity in F16.
4.6 Prime Splitting
In this section, we discuss how to factor ideals in rings of integers of number
fields. This section overlaps considerably with the previous section but it is
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important to understand this concept from an algebraic number theory point
of view. Hence this overlap is a small consequence. Suppose we have number
fields K ⊆ L (OK ⊆ OL), for an ideal a of OK, we want to know how aOL
factors in OK . In particular, we are interested in the case when a is prime
and K is a cyclotomic number field in K/Q.
Proposition 4.6.1. Let K be a number field and p be a non-zero prime ideal
of OK. Then p contains a rational prime.
From the above proposition [32] and our knowledge of ideals, we can conclude
that all non-zero primes ofOK divide an ideal of the form pOK for some prime
p ∈ Z. This tells us that we can determine all primes of OK by determining
the factorization of the ideals pOK .
We want to focus on K being the mth cyclotomic number field. But before
we can discuss this case, we must become familiar with some definitions and
notations. For a number field of degree n, if p is a prime ideal of OK and
p is a rational prime, we say that p lies above p, if p ∩ Z = pZ (see Figure
4.5). Recall that the residue field is the quotient of a commutative ring by a
p ⊂ OK ⊂ K
pZ ⊂ Z ⊂ Q
Figure 4.5: Depiction of p lying above p
maximal ideal, thus in this case, the residue field of pZ is Fp = Z/pZ. We are
interested in the residue field OK/p, it can be shown that this is an Fp-vector
space of finite dimension [32].
Definition 4.6.2. Let p be a prime of OK lying above p ∈ Z. We define the
ramification index e(p/p) to be the exact power of p dividing pOK.




The factorization of pOK can thus be written as [17].∏
p∩Z=pZ
pe(p/p)
It is useful to have a notion of size when dealing with these ideals. For a in
OK , we can define the ideal norm to be NK/Q(a) = |OK/a|. For a prime ideal
p, we have NK/Q(p) = |OK/p| = |F
dimFp (OK/p)
p | = |Fp|f(p/p) = pf(p/p). Like the
regular norm, the ideal norm is also multiplicative. The following gives us
the fundamental relationship between the ramification index, inertial degree
and degree of a number field [17]:
Proposition 4.6.4. Let K be a number field of degree n and p be a rational
prime such that
pOK = pe11 . . . perr





Even though it might be difficult to write down the explicit factors, we can
now describe a good way of factorizing cyclotomic polynomials. One of the
main results is that the mth cyclotomic polynomial is the “universal” poly-
nomial for testing if an element of a field is a primitive mth root of unity
[32].
Proposition 4.6.5. Let m be a positive integer and let K be a field of char-
acteristic not dividing m. Let α be an element of K. Then Φm(α) = 0 if and
only if α is a primitive mth root of unity.
Let K = Q(ζm) and p be a rational prime. Suppose p is a prime ideal of
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OK = Z[ζm] lying above p. We want to determine e and f for this particular
case. Since K is a Galois extension of Q, the following proposition is useful
[32]:
Proposition 4.6.6. Let K ⊂ L be a Galois extension of degree n and let p
be a prime of OK. Let
pOL = P
e1
1 . . .P
er
r
be the factorization of p in OL where ei = e(Pi/p). Let fi = f(Pi/p). Then
f1 = f2 = . . . = fr
e1 = e2 = . . . = er
In particular, reifi = n for all i.
It follows that Φm(x) factors in Fp[x] as
Φm(x) = (g1(x) . . . gr(x))
e
where deg(gi) = f for all i and efr = φ(m).
Let us consider the case that p - m, recall that xm − 1 =
∏
d|m Φd(x). Since
xm − 1 does not have any repeated roots in Fp[x], xm − 1 does not have any
repeated roots either. Specifically e = 1. Now we have to determine f and r.
We will focus on the special case of f = 1, then NK/Q(p) = p and OK/p ' Fp
which means that Φm(x) has roots in Fp. By Proposition 4.6.5, this means
that Fp has primitive mth roots of unity. Since Fp is a cyclic group of order
p− 1 , it has elements of exact order m− 1 if and only if p− 1 ≡ 0 (mod m).
Thus we have shown that a rational prime p splits Q(ζm) if and only if p ≡ 1
(mod m). The general case is covered in [32]. We obtain the result that we
have already seen in Theorem 4.5.3 but restated in terms of ramification
theory:
Proposition 4.6.7. Let p be a rational prime such that p - m and let p be
a prime ideal of Z[ζm] lying over p. Then e(p/p) = 1, f(p/p) is the order of
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p in (Z/mZ)∗ and there are exactly φ(m)/f(p/p) primes of Z[ζm] lying over
p.
Let us consider the following example where K = Q(ζ5). The behavior of
a rational prime in OK is determined by the residue class of p in (Z/mZ)∗.
If p ≡ 1 (mod 5), then p splits completely in OK . Consider p = 11 ≡ 1
(mod 5). We know that Φ5(x) = x
4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1, thus in modulo 11, we
have
x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 = (x+ 2)(x+ 6)(x+ 7)(x+ 8) (mod 11)
so
(11) = (11, ζ5 + 2)(11, ζ5 + 6)(11, ζ5 + 7)(11, ζ5 + 8)
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Chapter 5
Ring Learning With Errors
5.1 The LWE Problem
The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem was first introduced by Oded
Regev [28]. This was a huge breakthrough in cryptography, since crypto-
graphic constructions could now be based off the hardness of this problem
which was proven to be as hard as worst-case lattice problems. Given q ≥ 2
and n ∈ Z+, the LWE problem can be simply stated as recovering s ∈ Znq
from a sequence of “approximate” linear equations. If the equations were
exact, this problem could be solved very easily in polynomial time, using
Gaussian elimination. Stated formally [29]:
Define a probability distribution χ on Zq. Let As,χ be the probability distribu-
tion on Znq × Zq, obtained by choosing a vector a ∈ Znq uniformly at random
and e ∈ Zq according to χ. An algorithm solves the LWE problem if for any
s ∈ Znq , given a set of independent samples from As,χ, it outputs s with a
high probability.
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Definition 5.1.1. We denote poly(n) as
poly(n) = {f |f ∈ O(nc), for some c > 0}
Alternatively, the LWE problem can be stated as, given a set of samples
(polynomial in n), to determine whether they originated from the As,χ oracle
for some s or whether they follow the uniform distribution on Znq × Zq. The
decision version of the LWE problem (DLWE) is the problem of distinguishing
between LWE samples from the As,χ oracle and samples taken from a uniform
distribution [5]:
{ai, 〈ai · s〉+ ei}poly(n)i=1 ≈ {ai, ui}
poly(n)
i=1
where ui ∈ Zq is drawn uniformly at random. For a number q which is poly-
nomial in n and a normal distribution we can show that there is a reduction
from LWE to DLWE. One way to do this is to guess each coordinate of
s individually. Let s1 be our guess for the first coordinate of s, (a, b) be
our LWE pair and r drawn uniformly at random from Zq. We can send
(ã, b̃) = (a + (r, 0, . . . , 0), b+ rs1) to the decision oracle. Note that
b = 〈a · s〉+ e1
= 〈(a1, . . . , an) · (s1, . . . , sn)〉+ e1
= a1s1 + . . .+ ansn + e1
so we have,
b̃ = 〈ã · s〉+ e1
= 〈(a1 + r, a2, . . . , an) · (s1, . . . , sn)〉+ e1
= a1s1 + . . .+ ansn + e1 + rs1
= b+ rs1
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Now, if s1 is correct then the sample originated from the As,χ oracle, if it is
incorrect, then the sample originated from a uniform distribution. Thus we
can find the correct s1 after at most q attempts. This process can be repeated
n times to recover all the coordinates of s.
The best known algorithm for solving LWE is given by Blum, Kalai and
Wasserman [4] which requires 2O(n) samples and time. For cryptographic
applications, the modulus q is typically taken to be polynomial in n. The
hardness of LWE for polynomial moduli q is based on the fact that GAPSVP
or SIVP are hard to approximate to within polynomial factors even with a
quantum computer [29].
5.2 Probability Distributions
In this section we will provide a brief overview of the probability distribu-
tions used and their role in Learning With Errors, but for further details,
the reader is directed to [28]. The Gaussian distribution is the continu-




















Since we are dealing with lattices, we want to define a normal distribution
on vectors.
Recall that the sum of two independent normal variables with mean 0 and
variances σ21 and σ
2
2 is also a normal variable with mean 0 and variance
σ21 + σ
2






ρs(x) dx = s
n. We can then define the n dimensional prob-




We now have all the necessary tools to define a discrete Gaussian probability
distribution.
Definition 5.2.1. Given a countable set A ⊂ Rn and a parameter s > 0, the








For a probability density function φ on T, where T is the segment (0, 1] with
addition modulo 1, we can define the distribution on Znp × T (denoted by
As,φ) as the following: choose a vector a ∈ Znp uniformly at random, choose
e ∈ T according to φ and output (a, 〈a, s〉/p+ e).
Relating this back to the LWE problem: For an integer p ≥ 2, define χ : Zp →
R+ to be some probability distribution on Zp and for an integer n, let s ∈ Znp .
The discrete Gaussian distribution on Znp × Zp, denoted by As,χ is obtained
by choosing a ∈ Znp uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ Zp according to χ
and outputting (a, 〈a, s〉+ e). Here, additions are performed in Zp.
5.3 Classical and Quantum Reductions of LWE
In Chapter 1, we learned about two worst case lattice problems - the Shortest
Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). The classical
and quantum reductions of LWE rely heavily on the following variations of
these problems:
Definition 5.3.1. For λ1 ≥ 1, the γ-approximate Shortest Independent Vec-
tors Problem (SIV Pγ), given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice L =
L(B), asks to find linearly independent vectors v1,v2, . . . ,vn ∈ L such that
maxi ||vi|| ≤ γλ1(L), where λ1 is the smallest positive real r such that N(0, r) =
{x : ||x|| ≤ r} of radius r centered at the origin contains at least n linearly
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independent vectors.
Definition 5.3.2. GAPSV Pγ, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice
L = L(B) and a positive real d, asks to determine if λ1(L) ≤ d or λ1(L) > γd.
Definition 5.3.3. GAPSV Pζ,γ, for ζ(n) ≥ γ(n) ≥ 1, given a basis B and d
which satisfy the following conditions:
• B is a basis of an n-dimensional lattice L for which λ1(L) ≤ ζ(n)
• mini ||b̃i||
• 1 ≤ d ≤ ζ(n)/γ(n)
asks to determine if λ1(L) ≤ d or if λ1(L) > γ(n) · d.
The following lattice problem is similar in nature to CVP:
Definition 5.3.4. BDDα, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice L =
L(B) and a vector t such that dist(t, B) < αλ1(B), find the lattice vector
v ∈ L closest to t.
The dual of the lattice is a very important concept that is also used in defining
the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) later in the chapter.
Definition 5.3.5. L∗ is the dual of the lattice L, defined as the set of all
vectors y such that 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z for all vectors x ∈ L.
Definition 5.3.6. The smoothing parameter ( ηε(L)) for an n dimensional
lattice L and positive real ε > 0 is defined as the smallest s such that ρ1/s(L
∗\
0) ≤ ε.
Definition 5.3.7. A negligible function denoted by negl(n), is an f(n) such
that f(n) = o(n−c) for every fixed constant c.
We can define a Gaussian distribution on L as DL,r that assigns mass pro-
portional to exp(−π||x/r||2) to each point x ∈ L. Samples from DL,r are
lattice vectors of norm roughly
√
nr. Note that if r is too small, DL,r would
essentially be a deterministic distribution on the origin, thus we require r to
be not too small (specific lower bounds on r are given in [29]). Gentry et al.
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, showed how to sample from a discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice
L using the following proposition [13]:
Proposition 5.3.8 (Theorem 4.1). There exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm that, given an n-dimensional lattice L = L(B) and r ≥
maxi ||b̃i|| ·ω(
√
log n) outputs a sample that is within negligible statistical dis-
tance of DL,r.
The core of the LWE hardness result lies in the proposition that assuming we
have access to an LWE oracle with modulus q and error α, and the following
inputs: lattice L, a polynomial number of samples from a discrete Gaussian
distribution DL∗,r, and a point x within distance αq/(
√
2r) of any point in
L, solving LWE can be reduced to solving the BDDα problem in polynomial
time.
Regev [26] gave a quantum reduction from worst-case GAPSV P and SV P
to LWE. This result holds as long as there is no quantum algorithm that
solves GAPSV P or SIV P , thus in a way, this is weaker than a classical
reduction. Peikert showed that the LWE problem can be reduced classically
to a variant of GAPSV Pγ, namely GAPSV Pζ,γ. This variant is equivalent
to GAPSV Pγ for large values of ζ, and occurs when q is exponential in n.
In order to achieve this, he used the classical part of Regev’s reduction [28]:
Lemma 5.3.9. Let ε(n) be a negligible function, q(n) ≥ 2 be an integer
and α(n) ∈ (0, 1) be a real number. Given a polynomial number of samples,
assume that we have access to an oracle W that solves LWEq,Ψα. Then there
exists a constant c > 0 and an efficient algorithm R that given as input: basis
B of a lattice L, a parameter r ≥
√




Here Ψα is a discrete Gaussian distribution, ηε is the smoothing parameter.
The main theorem is the following [26]:
Theorem 5.3.10. Suppose α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and γ(n) ≥ n/(α
√
log n). Let
ζ(n) ≥ γ(n) and q(n) ≥ ζ(n) ·ω(
√
(log n)/n). Then there is a probabilis-
tic polynomial-time reduction from solving GAPSV Pζ,γ in the worst case to
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solving LWEq,Ψα using poly(n) samples.
In order to efficiently generate samples from a Gaussian distribution that is
within a fixed statistical distance in Regev’s quantum reduction part, lattice
reduction algorithms like the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) are used [19].
This approximation algorithm outputs a short vector, not necessarily the
shortest vector and a whole reduced basis. As seen in chapter 1, LLL can
approximate SVP within a factor of O((2/
√
3)n).
The Blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) Algorithm is the best lattice reduc-
tion algorithm known in practice [6]. It outputs a BKZ-reduced basis with
blocksize β ≥ 2 and reduction factor ε > 0, from an input basis B of a lattice
L. It starts by LLL-reducing the basis B, then iteratively reduces each local
block to make sure that the first vector of each such block is the shortest in
the projected lattice. No good upper bound is known for the time complexity
of this algorithm.
5.4 The Ring-LWE Problem
Although the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem has been used in many
cryptographic applications due to its strong security assumptions, these ap-
plications are relatively inefficient due to requiring at least n vectors. This
leads to key sizes of order n2 which means there is an inherent quadratic
overhead. In order to produce an alternative that improves upon this effi-
ciency, the Ring-LWE problem was introduced [21].
Let K = Q(ζm) where ζm ∈ C is a primitive mth root of unity, define
R = OK = Z[ζm] as its ring of integers. Let q ≡ 1 mod m be a prime that is
polynomial in n. Then, informally, the ring-LWE problem can be described
as follows:
Assuming that the search version of SVP is considered to be hard to approx-
imate by polynomial time quantum algorithms in the worst case on ideal
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lattices in R to within a fixed poly(n) factor, then any poly(n) number of
samples drawn from the Ring-LWE distribution are pseudorandom to any
polynomial time (possibly quantum) attacker.
The proof for this statement is done in two components, the first compo-
nent is a quantum reduction from the worst-case SVP on ideal lattices to the
search version of Ring-LWE. Assuming that the search version of Ring-LWE
is hard, the authors then prove that the Ring-LWE distribution is indeed
pseudorandom. In this section, we discuss the mathematical tools and prop-
erties used by the authors to achieve this [21]. In the next section we focus
on the properties of cyclotomic number fields that make them a good fit for
this proof.
Duality. For any lattice L in K, i.e, for the Z-span of any Q-basis of K, its
dual is defined by
L∗ = {β ∈ K : tr(βL) ∈ Z}
Error Distribution. Although the error distribution is an essential part
of this proof, we will not go into its discussion in great detail. The reader
is advised to look at [21] for further clarifications. Recall that in the LWE
problem, the Gaussian distribution used was one-dimensional, in the Ring-
LWE problem, the error is an n-dimensional Gaussian where n is the degree
of the mth cyclotomic number field K. The error is chosen according to a
discretized Gaussian with respect to a special basis of the space in which R
is embedded using the Minkowski embedding. In this way, an n dimensional
Gaussian distribution is simply represented by n parameters.
The Ring-LWE problem is associated with the Ring-LWE distribution which
is parameterized by a number field K with ring of integers R = OK and a
rational integer modulus q ≥ 2. Let R∗ denote the dual of R. The number
field K is mapped to Cn using the Minkowski embedding that we saw in
Chapter 3. Recall that the resulting vector space Cn endowed with a stan-
dard inner product. The discretized Gaussian distribution T = KR/R∗ is the
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spherical Gaussian with respect to this inner product, discretized to R∗ [11].
The Ring-LWE distribution is formally defined as [21]:
Definition 5.4.1. For secret s ∈ R∗q and error distribution ψ over the
Minkowski space KR, a sample from the ring-LWE distribution As,Ψ over
Rq × T is generated by choosing a ← Rq uniformly at random, choosing
e← ψ, and outputting (a, b = (a · s)/q + e (mod R∗)).
For cryptographic applications, we are interested in the average case decision
version of the Ring-LWE problem whose hardness means that the ring-LWE
distribution is pseudorandom.
Definition 5.4.2. Let Υ be a distribution over a family of error distribu-
tions, each over KR. The average case decision version of the ring-LWE
problem denoted by R-DLWEq,Υ is to distinguish with non-negligible advan-
tage between arbitrarily many independent samples from As,ψ for a random
choice of (s, ψ)← U(R∗q)×Υ and the same number of uniformly random and
independent samples from Rq × T.
The main theorem is stated as follows [21]:
Theorem 5.4.3. Let K be the mth cyclotomic number field having dimension
n = φ(m) and R = OK be its ring of integers. Let α = α(n) > 0 and
let q = q(n) ≥ 2, q = 1 (mod m) be a poly(n)-bounded prime such that
αq ≥ ω(
√
log n). Then there is a polynomial-time quantum reduction from
Õ(
√
n/α)-approximate SIVP (or SVP) to R-DLWEq,Υα.
5.5 Cyclotomic Number Fields
Let K = Q(ζm) where m is a primitive root of unity which has a minimal
polynomial Φm(x) of degree n = φ(m) and R = OK = Z[ζm] is its ring of
integers. Many properties of cyclotomic number fields are useful both in the
proof to show that the Ring-LWE distribution is pseudorandom as well as
to perform efficient computations in the number field. We have seen most of
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these properties in previous chapters, in this section we will summarize the
properties that are used in proving the pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE in a
concise manner. The properties of cyclotomic fields pertaining to efficiency
will be discussed in the next chapter.
Galois extension. From Theorem 4.4.3, we know that Q(ζm) is a Galois
extension of Q, more precisely
Gal(Q(ζm)/Q) ' (Z/mZ)∗
where each σ ∈ Gal(Q(ζm)/Q) maps to [k] ∈ (Z/mZ)∗ if and only if σ(ζm) =
ζkm. Thus there are n = φ(m) automorphisms σk given by the above. Since
Φm(x) is irreducible (Theorem 4.4.2), the transitive property applies (Theo-
rem 4.2.4) to the permutation group corresponding to Gal(Q(ζm)/Q).
Prime splitting. Given a prime q ≡ 1 (mod m), from Theorem 4.5.3, we




(x−ωi). In Chapter 3.6, we have seen that the ideal q lying
above q can be factored in K as q =
∏
i∈Z∗m
qi where qi = 〈q, ζm − ωi〉 where
NK/Q(q) = q. The above properties are heavily relied upon when proving the





This chapter exploits the Ring-LWE hardness problem in a cryptographic
setting and shows experimental results for measuring the performance of
homomorphic multiplication by varying the different parameters associated
with the cipherspace ring in this cryptosystem.
6.1 Homomorphic Encryption System
The following encryption scheme has been described in [20] with some changes
regarding Key Switching and Ring Tunneling introduced in [8]. The reader
is advised to read [8] for a more detailed discussion. The main parameters in
this cryptosystem are the rings of integers of Q(ζm) and Q(ζm′), denoted by
R = Z[ζm] = Om and R′ = Z[ζm′ ] = Om′ where m|m′, making R a subring
of R′. Thus we can embed R into R′ by identifying ζm with ζ
m′/m
m′ . In the
reverse direction we can ‘twace’ from R′ to R. The “twace” is an R linear
function that fixes R pointwise.
66
The dual ideal is the principal fractional ideal R∗ = (gm/m̂)R where m̂ =
m/2 if m is even and m̂ = m otherwise. The special element gm ∈ R is
defined as follows:
• when m = pe for prime p and e ≥ 1, we have
gm =
gp = 1− ζp, p is oddgp = 1, p = 2
• when m =
∏




This is used for managing error terms in the following encryption system.
Although the secret s is sampled from R∗ to prove the Ring-LWE hardness,
it is more convenient to use R for practical purposes when sampling s. This
can be done without any loss in security or efficiency [8] by working with an
equivalent “tweaked” form of the problem, which is obtained by multiplying
the noisy products bi by a certain factor t = tm ∈ Rm for which t ·R∗ = R.
The new noisy products are now
b′i = t · bi = ai · (t · s) + t · ei mod qR
The error term t · ei now comes from the “tweaked” distribution t ·ψ.
• Key Space, Plaintext Space, Ciphertext Space
The secret key s is an element of R′. For a small positive integer p
that is coprime with every prime factor of m′, the plaintext space is
defined as Rp = R/pR. For an integer modulus q ≥ p that is coprime
to p, we define the ciphertext space as R′q = R
′/qR′. Note that al-
though the Ring-LWE hardness was initially proven for prime q ≡ 1
(mod m), recent developments [26] show that the hardness can be ex-
tended to any integer q [20]. For an (unknown) secret key S, consid-
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ered an indeterminant, we can think of a ciphertext as a polynomial
c(S) ∈ R′q[S]. An alternate way to think of c(S) is as a vector of coef-
ficients (c0, c1, . . . , cd) ∈ (R′q)d+1, where d is the degree of c(S). Addi-
tionally a ciphertext is parameterized by a non-negative integer k and
a factor l ∈ Zp.
• Encryption
In order to encrypt a message µ ∈ Rp under a secret key s ∈ R′, sample
an error term e ∈ µ + pR′, a uniformly random element c1 ← R′q and
output c(S) = (e − c1 · s) + c1 ·S ∈ R′q[S] with k = 0 and l = 1. Note
that this particular form of c(S) is called the LSD (Least Significant
Digit) form. Formally, a ciphertext in LSD form satisfies
c(s) ≡ c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cdsd ≡ e (mod qR′)
for some sufficiently small error term e ∈ R′ such that
e ≡ l−1 · gkm′ ·µ (mod pR′)
An alternate form that is more convenient for homomorphic operations
is the MSD (Most Significant Digit) form defined by
c(s) ≈ q
p
· (l−1 · gkm′µ) (mod qR′)
A ciphertext can be converted from LSD to MSD form and vice-versa
in linear time.
• Decryption
Decrypting the LSD-form ciphertext c(S) ∈ R′q[S] under the secret key
s ∈ R′ involves evaluating c(s) ∈ R′q first and then lifting the result
to R′ in order to recover the error term e ≡ l−1 · gkm′ ·µ (mod pR′).
Computing l · g−km′ · e (mod pR′) yields the embedding of the message µ
which is recovered in Rp by taking the twace [27].
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• Homomomorphic Addition and Multiplication
If k and l of two ciphertexts are the same, then the homomorphic addi-
tion simply involves converting both to the same form (LSD or MSD)
and then adding their polynomials. If the k and l values are different,
then they are adjusted as needed by multiplying the polynomial by an
appropriate factor which only slightly increases the error.
The more complicated operation is homomorphic multiplication. Con-
sider two messages µ1 and µ2 encrypted as ciphertexts c1(S) and c2(S)
in LSD form with auxiliary values k1, l1 and k2, l2 respectively. Recall
that the LSD form of the ciphertexts are c1(s) = e1 (mod qR
′) and
c2(s) = e2 (mod qR
′). Then the multiplication is performed as follows:
c1(s) · c2(s) · g′m ≡ e1 · e2 · g′m (mod qR′)
We know e1 = l
−1
1 · gk1m ·µ1 and e2 = l−12 · gk2m ·µ2, then
e1 · e2 · g′m ≡ (l1l2)−1 · g
k1+k2+1
m′ · (µ1, µ2) (mod pR
′)
Since the error term e = e1 · e2 · gm′ satisfies the invariant, we can con-
clude that the LSD-form resultant ciphertext is given by
c(S) = c1(S) · c2(S) · gm′ ∈ R′q[S]
In other words, c(S) encrypts µ1µ2 ∈ Rp with auxiliary values k =
k1 + k2 + 1 and l = l1l2 ∈ Zp.
In order to handle the increase in the degree of the ciphertext poly-
nomial with every homomorphic multiplication, a method called Key
Switching is performed. This method allows us to convert the cipher-
text under one secret key to another secret key (may or may not be
different) while preserving the secrecy of the messages and the keys and
also reducing the degree of the ciphertext, typically back to linear [27].
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6.2 Efficiency of Cyclotomic Number Fields
As seen in the previous chapter, cyclotomic number fields offer very nice
properties that help prove the pseudorandomness of the Ring-LWE distribu-
tion. In this section, we highlight the properties of cyclotomic number fields
that make homomorphic multiplication more efficient. Keep in mind that
although we may denote the ring of integers as R and the cyclotomic index
as m for ease of notation, these properties are mainly pertaining to the cy-
clotomic index m′ where R′ = Om′ , since R′q is where all the operations on
ciphertexts occur.
Tensor Product Representation. In Chapter 2.4 we learned about ten-
sor products over R-modules. Since K = Q(ζm) is a field extension of Q, it
behaves as a vector space over Q. If m =
∏
lml is the prime power decom-
position of m, then
K ' Q[X1, X2, . . .]/(Φm1(X1),Φm2(X2), . . .).
Extending Theorem 3.4.4 to l ideals (Φml(Xl)), we have
Q[X]/(Φm(X)) ' ⊗lQ[Xl]/(Φml(Xl)).
Equivalently we can write
K ' ⊗lKl.
This decomposition allows for efficient algorithms by modularly reducing op-
erations in K to their prime-power-indexed cyclotomic counterparts in Kl.
This method altogether avoids working with polynomials modulo Φm(X)
which might lead to slower computations depending on m.
Choice of cipherspace modulus. Although [21] requires q ≡ 1 (mod m)
for proving the hardness of Ring-LWE, the pseudorandomness can now be
shown for any q by using modulus switching techniques [26]. Thus this re-
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striction is not imposed in the paper that describes efficient algorithms [20].
It is still desirable, however to choose prime q ≡ 1 (mod m) in order to make
operations more efficient. This is because for q ≡ 1 (mod m) we know that
f(q/q) = 1, and by Proposition 4.6.7 there are φ(m) primes of R lying over





where qi’s are the prime ideals in R above q and R = Om. This special case
supports efficient operations in R/qR.
Discrete Fourier Transform. In order to understand fast polynomial mul-
tiplication algorithms, we will use the concept of a Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT). For a commutative ring R and primitive mth root of unity ω,
Definition 6.2.1. • The R-linear map
DFTm :
Rm → Rmf → (f(1), f(ω), f(ω), . . . , f(ωm−1))
which evaluates a polynomial at the powers of ω is called the Discrete




j ∈ R[x] of degree less
than n with its coefficient vector (f0, f1, . . . , fm−1) ∈ Rm.









in R[x] is the polynomial












fjgl−j for 0 ≤ l < m
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If we regard the coefficients as vectors in Rm then h is called the cyclic
convolution of the vectors f and g.
This idea of convolution is equivalent to polynomial multiplication in the ring
R[x]/〈xn − 1〉, and this relationship is exploited to obtain fast polynomial
multiplication algorithms. The DFT is a special multipoint evaluation at
the powers of 1, ω, ω2, . . . , ωm−1. It can be shown that both the DFT and
its inverse (the interpolation at the powers of ωn) can be computed with
O(n log n) operations in R, as opposed to the naive polynomial multiplication
which is O(n2). An important algorithm that computes the DFT is the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) [12].
Theorem 6.2.2. Let R be a commutative ring which has a primitive nth root
of unity where n = 2k for some k ∈ N. Then convolution in R[x]/〈xn−1〉 and
multiplication of polynomials f, g ∈ R[x] with deg(fg) < n can be performed
using 3n log n additions in R, 3
2
n log n+n−2 multiplications by powers of ω, n
multiplications in R and n divisions by n, in total 9
2
n log n+O(n) arithmetic
operations.
The case where m = 2k, such that k ∈ N is a special case. This is because
using the FFT algorithm makes multiplication in R′ significantly faster (The-
orem 6.2.2). Note that even though in principle, all cases of m can be imple-
mented in O(n log n), the generic algorithms that can achieve this have large
constants hidden in the O( · ) notation [20]. This special power-of-two case
has been exploited by previous work done in this area [18]. In order to make
efficient algorithms that perform polynomial multiplication in O(n log n) for
any cyclotomic index, the tensor decomposition of DFTm is taken advantage
of:
DFTm = ⊗lDFTml
Let ml be a power of some prime p, using the Cooley-Tukey decompostion,
DFTml can be reduced to ml/p parallel applications of DFTp where each
DFTp takes O(p log p) time. The total runtime can be applied in O(n log n)
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time where n = φ(m).
In [20], the authors also use the definition of DFTm to define the Chinese
Remainder Transform (CRTm) obtained by restricting the rows of DFTm
matrix to those indexed by Z∗m and columns indexed by [φ(m)].
CRTm = ⊗lCRTml
Applying this tensor decomposition reduces to φ(m/ml) parallel applications
of CRTml . Each CRTml can be done in O(ml logml) time, thus making the
total runtime O(m logm).
Powerful Basis. Recall from Theorem 3.2.10 that cyclotomic number fields
are monogenic. This means that K has an integral basis of the form p =
{1, ζm, ζ2m, . . . ζ
φ(m)−1
m }. p is often called the power basis ofK. For prime power
m, the power basis coincides with the definition of the powerful basis. For an
arbitrary m having prime power factorization m =
∏
lml the powerful basis
is defined to be p = ⊗lpl where pl is the power basis of each Kl = Q(ζml).
A strong property of the powerful basis is that its elements are close to
orthogonal. This helps in making the algorithms that use Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization of the powerful basis for sampling from discrete Gaussians
over R execute in substantially less time [20].
6.3 Experiments
Homomorphic multiplication has always been the crutch of homomorphic en-
cryption schemes, since multiplying two ciphertexts increases the noise mul-
tiplicatively which gets out of hand after a certain level of mutliplicaitons,
making it impossible to recover the original plaintext from the resulting ci-
phertext. Homomorphic addition on the other hand is not a big issue since
the error terms grow at a smaller rate with each addition, and it is easy
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to handle this error growth. This section describes the different experiments
performed using the library for ring-based lattice cryptography ( Λ◦λ ). The
experiments test the performance of homomorphic multiplication by varying
different parameters associated with this operation including the cyclotomic
index m′ and the cipherspace modulus q.
6.3.1 Criterion Package
The Criterion Package is used to benchmark the multiplication of two cipher-
texts. Instead of recording the raw timings of each multiplication performed,
this package gives an indication of which times occur more frequently. More
specifically, it uses a boxplot technique to develop a quick sense of the qual-
ity of the timing data. One of the interesting features of this package is that
Criterion figures out how many times it needs to evaluate a given function
in order to get the most accurate performance measurements by characteriz-
ing the system’s clock and figuring out how expensive it is to use the clock.
Another important feature is its use of bootstrapping to perform some sta-
tistical analysis to report the mean and standard deviation of our data along
with the 95% confidence intervals for those values. Most importantly, it re-
ports outliers in our measurements and tells us whether they are relevant. In
other words, when running performance benchmarks, if there are other pro-
cesses running at the same time, these processes can affect the results of our
benchmark. The bootstrap feature tells us whether our results are relatively
accurate or completely insignificant.
6.3.2 Experiment One
The first experiment tests the performance of homomorphic multiplication
when the cyclotomic index m′ falls under three test cases - m′ being prime,
prime square and composite. Each test case has ten sample points which
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are “comparable” in magnitude to the sample points in the corresponding
test cases (see Table 6.1). The benchmark for homomorphic multiplication
is run with the m′ values given as below and fixed tensor RT , plaintext ring
cyclotomic index m = m′ as well as plaintext ring modulus p = 2. The
modulus for the ciphertext ring q is chosen by a function goodQs that takes
a lower bound and m′ and produces an infinite list of primes which satisfy
q ≡ 1 (mod m′). Because we are not concerned about the security in this
experimentg, we set the lower bound to be m′ as well.
Primes Prime Squares Composites
1 47 49=72 45 = 5 · 32
2 127 121=112 125 = 53
3 167 169=132 171 = 32 · 19
4 293 289 = 172 291 = 3 · 97
5 359 361 = 192 365 = 5 · 73
6 523 529 = 232 531 = 32 · 59
7 839 841 = 292 845 = 5 · 132
8 967 961 = 312 965 = 5 · 193
9 1367 1369 = 372 1371 = 3 · 457
10 1693 1681 = 412 1683 = 32 · 11 · 17
Table 6.1: Sample values for m′ in Experiment 1
Figure 6.1 shows that homomorphic multiplication where the cyclotomic in-
dex is a large prime takes much longer time than a prime square or a com-
posite of comparable magnitude. Since the tensor decomposition of a prime
m′ is just R′q itself, this means that polynomial multiplication is done naively
O(n2), where n = φ(m′), as opposed to the fast polynomial multiplication
that is done when m′ is a composite or a prime power. For the prime square





l to run parallel computations on its corresponding base
rings, therefore making this operation more efficient.
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Figure 6.1: Experiment One Results
6.3.3 Experiment Two
Recall that when m′ = 2k where k is a positive integer, the ability to compute
polynomial multiplications using Fast Fourier Transforms makes the set-up
very efficient. The homomorphic multiplication is thus tested on cases of m′
where it is either a power of two or composite (See Table 6.2). Figure 6.2
shows that the performance of homomorphic multiplication increases linearly
with increase in cyclotomic index for the power of two case. It also shows
that the power of two case is on average faster than the composite case. This
is because for the power of two case (m′ = 2k), the tensor decomposition
of R′q ' ⊗Zq[ζ2k ], as opposed to the composite case (m′ =
∏
lml) where
R′q ' ⊗lZq[ζml ] and each ml could be a power of 2 or a power of a prime that
is greater than 2.











in R′q ' ⊗lZq[ζm′l ]. In Experiment 1, consider line 10 of Table 6.1, although
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Power of Twos Composites
1 32=25 35 = 5 · 7
2 64=26 62 = 31 · 2
3 128=27 130 = 5 · 13 · 2
4 256 = 28 253 = 11 · 23
5 512 = 29 518 = 2 · 7 · 37
6 1024 = 210 1025 = 52 · 41
7 2048 = 212 2050 = 2 · 52 · 41
8 4096 = 213 4100 = 22 · 52 · 41
9 8192 = 214 8200 = 23 · 52 · 41
10 16384 = 215 16376 = 23 · 23 · 89
Table 6.2: Sample values for m′ in Experiment 2
Figure 6.2: Experiment Two Results
412 = 1681 < 1683 = 32 · 11 · 17, the performance with the latter is better
than the former (See Figure 6.1). A similar observation can be made about
the 10th entry of Table 6.2, although 213 ≤ 16376 = 23 · 23 · 89 ≤ 215, we
see that the performance of homomorphic multiplication with m′ = 16376 is
considerably higher than with m′ = 215 (See Figure 6.2). These experimental
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results indicate that the magnitude of the prime affects the performance more







l ) = O(p
kl
l · kl log pl) , for cyclotomic indices of
comparable magnitude, the trade-off is between the relatively bigger power
kl, but smaller log pl of a smaller prime and the relatively smaller kl, but
bigger log pl of a bigger prime.
6.3.4 Experiment Three
In order to ensure that the choice of the modulus q did not affect the per-
formance of homomorphic multiplication, we ran an experiment in which we
fixed the cyclotomic indices to be the power of two case as before (see Table
6.2) and varied q by using some of the elements of the potentially infinite list
generated by the function goodQs, where our choice was n = 1, 10, 50, 500.
Recall that given a lower bound and a cyclotomic index m, goodQs generates
an infinite list of primes q above the lower bound which satisfy the condition
q ≡ 1 (mod m). Figure 6.3 shows that the change in q does not affect the
performance of homomorphic multiplication significantly.
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The main goal behind this work was to explore the mathematical properties
offered by cyclotomic number fields that make them the ideal candidate for
the underlying plaintextspace and ciphertextspace in current homomorphic
encryption schemes. The main questions that we wanted to answer was -
Why use cyclotomic number fields? How do they contribute to the efficiency
of such schemes?
Although we have answered these questions to a certain extent, there is plenty
more to investigate in this regard. From a theoretical standpoint, the use of
Gaussian distributions and how they tie into the rest of the components
can be explained in much more detail than in this work. From the efficiency
standpoint, the performance of key-switching and ring tunneling needs to be
investigated by varying the cyclotomic index and modulus.
There are two main factors that affect the performance of homomorphic
multiplication when changing the underlying cyclotomic index m′ of the ci-
pherspace ring R′q - the magnitude of each prime and the power of the prime
in the prime power of factorization of m′ =
∏
lml. Our experiments indicate
that the magnitude of the prime affects the performance more than the power
of the prime in cyclotomic indices of comparable magnitude.
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The homomorphic encryption scheme used in our experiments (from Λ ◦ λ
library) is not recommended for use in production because it may be prone
to timing or side-channel attacks. Although the library implements fast al-
gorithms for sampling from Gaussian distributions as described by the liter-
ature, their current implementation is not very exact in terms of precision
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